U sing a novel experimental paradigm, we explore how the experience of generating an idea and the possibility that another investor might adopt a rejected investment opportunity, bias the investment decisions of innovator and imitator entrepreneurs. We find that individuals who generate a business idea form biased evaluations of the economic potential of ideas, be it their own idea or somebody else's idea. On the one hand, they are overconfident about the value of, and overly likely to invest in, their own idea. On the other hand, when investing in another person's idea, even if it is not competing with their own idea, they are underconfident about the value of, and insufficiently likely to invest in, the idea. Surprisingly, we find that entrepreneurial experience exacerbates this pattern of over-and underconfidence. In addition, we find that the threat that another investor can appropriate a declined investment opportunity increases willingness to invest. We propose a theoretical account to explain the observed pattern of over-and underconfidence in imitative and innovative entrepreneurship. Our findings challenge the traditional account that lowering the cost of imitation has a disincentive effect on the investment decisions of pioneer entrepreneurs and provide evidence that a more lenient appropriability regime may, unexpectedly, have positive effects on entrepreneurship. Our findings also identify new psychological mechanisms that can play a role in important phenomena such as the emergence of spin-offs and rush to market entry.
Introduction
Economic theories of entrepreneurship assume that entrepreneurs' investment decisions are guided by maximization of expected returns. However, empirical evidence in the literature on entrepreneurship (e.g., Cooper et al. 1988 , Busenitz and Barney 1997 , Camerer and Lovallo 1999 , Keh et al. 2002 , Åstebro 2003 and business strategy (Hodgkinson et al. 1999) suggests that individuals' valuations of opportunities may be subject to systematic biases and influences that fall outside of the range of the standard economic perspective. Besides the fact that entrepreneurs may be subject to the same heuristics and biases as documented among other decision makers, as highlighted in the behavioral literature on entrepreneurship, we provide evidence that entrepreneurs have deeply personal connections to the ideas they can invest in. A classic paper by Abelson (1986) drew attention to, as the title expressed it, the observation that "beliefs are like possessions." In this paper, we discuss, and demonstrate empirically, that the same is true for the ideas generated and invested in by entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs who generate an idea get disproportionately attached to their own idea and are dismissive of ideas proposed by others, and when entrepreneurs have an opportunity to invest in an idea, they are more likely to do so if failing to invest means that the opportunity may go to somebody else.
We explore the impact of two psychological factors that have not received attention in prior psychologically oriented research on entrepreneurial investment decisions. The first has to do with the question of whether an individual has generated her own idea. Most entrepreneurs follow neither a purely innovative nor a purely imitative investment strategy. Innovators, by definition, pursue their own ideas, but most innovators also act as imitators who monitor the emerging ideas of others to potentially exploit promising ones (Ziegler 1985, Gans and Stern 2003) . Conventional economic theories of entrepreneurship do not draw a strong distinction between these two types of investment decisions, and they assume that both are valued purely on the basis of their expected returns. We propose, in contrast, that the experience of generating an idea affects potential entrepreneurs' evaluations not only of that idea but also of others' ideas. We find that people who generate ideas tend to be excessively enthusiastic about, overconfident in, and willing to invest in those ideas. More surprisingly, we predict and find that developing an entrepreneurial idea makes people overly critical of, underconfident in, and hence unwilling to invest in others' ideas, even if those other ideas do not compete against the individual's own idea. Potential entrepreneurs who have not created an idea, in contrast to those who have, show appropriate levels of confidence, and invest appropriately, in ideas proposed by other people. We also find that entrepreneurial experience does not reduce but exacerbates these patterns of overand underconfidence. Prior experimental research on the valuation of entrepreneurial opportunities has not addressed the distinction between innovative and imitative investment decisions-i.e., investing in ideas generated by the investor or by someone else-but has either focused only on opportunities that were based on the decision maker's idea (e.g., Åstebro 2003) or not considered the source of idea generation as a relevant factor (e.g., Keh et al. 2002) .
The second factor our study addresses is whether an idea not invested in could potentially be invested in by another individual. Following up on prior research on the role of "social takeover" in betting decisions (Hoelzl and Loewenstein 2005) , we hypothesize and find that potential entrepreneurs are more likely to invest if there is a chance that someone else can appropriate their opportunity if they fail to invest, even though the other person's decision has no material consequences for them.
We present results from a novel incentive-compatible experiment that investigates the joint impact of idea generation and the possibility that someone else can appropriate one's idea on the valuation of, and tendency to invest in, entrepreneurial opportunities. We also present results from a follow-up experiment that provides further supportive evidence for our predictions and proposed theoretical account of the impact of idea generation. Overall, we find that the experience of creating an idea results in overconfidence in the promise of one's own idea but underconfidence in the promise of somebody else's idea, and that both overconfidence and underconfidence translate into differential willingness to invest. We also find that investors may be driven in part by takeover anxiety-a fear that if they fail to exploit an opportunity, someone else will do so. By providing evidence that a decrease in the stringency of enforcement of intellectual property rights may, surprisingly, have positive effects on entrepreneurship, our findings challenge the long-held assumption that lowering the cost of imitation has a disincentive effect on the investment decisions of pioneer entrepreneurs. Furthermore, our findings indicate that entrepreneurial experience is not a remedy for, and may even exacerbate, biased investment valuations and decisions. We elaborate more on our findings and their implications in the conclusion of the paper.
Background
Overconfidence, Underconfidence, and Idea Generation Camerer and Lovallo (1999) study the role of overconfidence in entrepreneurship using a stylized experiment in which individuals have the choice of whether or not to enter into a competition. Finding that individuals were likely to overenter and lose money in skill-based competitions (but not in chance-based tasks), and that this pattern persisted when individuals could self-select into a skill-based competition, they suggest that overestimation of one's own skill relative to others and neglect of the fact that others will self-select into competitions in which they are themselves skilled, help to explain excess entry in skill-based competitions. Malmendier and Tate (2005) , using field data, find that managers invest excessively when using internal funds but underutilize external financing. They attribute both results to overoptimism. Managers overuse internal funds because they are overly optimistic about their investments, but they underutilize external funds because they believe that equity markets undervalue their firms and raise their cost of capital above what it should be. Moore and Cain (2007) argue, however, that overconfidence is not necessarily pervasive. Running a study modeled closely on Camerer and Lovallo's (1999) experimental design, they find that overconfidence and excess entry are common when people compete on easy skill-based tasks but that the opposite pattern emerges when tasks are perceived as difficult.
Prior research has not addressed whether business idea generation is usually perceived as an easy task or a difficult task. Interviews and writings published in magazines and websites whose main focus is business or entrepreneurship provide evidence for both perspectives. While some entrepreneurs express the view that "ideas are easy, execution is difficult" (e.g., Masnick 2008) , others believe that the difficult part of entrepreneurship is coming up with a promising business idea (e.g., Andrews 2011). Moore and Healy (2008) , building on the theoretical account initially proposed by Moore and Cain (2007) and Moore and Small (2007) , propose an information-theoretic account of the pattern of Downloaded from informs.org by [128.237.144 .175] on 21 January 2017, at 10:08 . For personal use only, all rights reserved.
over-and underconfidence for easy and difficult tasks. According to their account people are uncertain about their own performance but even more uncertain about others' performance. To the extent that information about performance is lacking, a good initial assumption about performance level (a good "prior") would be the group average. People usually possess better information about themselves than about others; thus, they update from their prior beliefs more for themselves than for others. Because of uncertainty, therefore, judgments about both one's own and others' performance tend to be regressive. However, because of inferior information about others, judgments about others tend to be more regressive than judgments about oneself. This leads people to underestimate their absolute performance and overestimate their relative performance on easy tasks, but to display the opposite pattern for difficult tasks. Kruger (1999) proposes an alternative account of over-and underconfidence based on egocentrism. According to this account, when forming judgments of relative confidence, people focus first, and disproportionately, on the self, because information about the self is more readily and automatically available and people have a greater database of information about themselves than about others. On easy tasks, people recognize that they are performing well and take insufficient account of the fact that the task is likely to be easy for others as well, leading to relative overconfidence. On difficult tasks, the reverse pattern occurs, leading to relative underconfidence. Norton et al. (2012) introduce the notion of an "Ikea effect," which, among other implications, suggests that underestimation of absolute performance on easy tasks is not universal. (Note that Moore and Healy's 2008 theory predicts overestimation of relative performance and underestimation of absolute performance, on easy tasks. Kruger and Dunning (1999) also find that people tend to underestimate their absolute performance on easy tasks.) Norton et al. find that exerting personal effort to generate something, be it a hedonic or utilitarian product, leads to increased valuation of the product. Their findings hold true for tasks that are as easy as assembling the simplest box sold by Ikea. They also find that people are unaware of their bias, as they expect the products of their personal effort to be similarly overly valued by other individuals. In a related study, Kruger et al. (2004) show that when people lack information about an item's quality, they assume that the quality must be higher if greater effort was put into its creation.
The main focus of our study is not on whether people are, on average, over-or underconfident, but on the impact of the act of generating an idea on relative confidence (i.e., on confidence in how an idea one can invest in stacks up against other ideas), an issue that is particularly relevant to entrepreneurial decision making. Our findings suggest that those who did not generate an idea do not exhibit over-or underconfidence when investing in an idea, but those who generated an idea show either overconfidence or underconfidence depending on whether they have the option to invest in their own idea or in somebody else's idea (that does not compete with one's own idea).
Overall, our findings suggest that business idea generation was perceived as an easy task by our study participants. Kruger (1999) , Moore and Cain (2007) , and Moore and Healy (2008) all predict that if idea generation is perceived as an easy task, then people will tend to overestimate the quality of their own known ideas relative to others' unknown ideas, a situation characteristic of much entrepreneurial decision making, as well as of one experimental treatment in our study. Overinvestment in one's own idea would also be consistent with people's welldocumented tendency to perceive themselves in a positive light (Tesser 1988; Tirole 2002, 2003) and to overweight information derived from personal experience (Simonsohn et al. 2008) , as well as with Malmendier and Tate's (2005) research on managerial overconfidence.
In addition to examining people's investments in their own ideas, we studied another key condition in which individuals who had generated their own idea had the opportunity to invest in another person's (known) idea. We designed the experiment so that the idea that can be invested in would not, in fact, compete with one's own idea. Hence, from a rational economic perspective, whether an individual generated her own idea should not be relevant to the decision of whether and how much to invest in the other person's idea. We included this condition because we did expect it to matter. Specifically, we anticipated that people who had developed their own idea would evaluate specific other ideas they encountered more negatively than would people who had not developed their own idea.
Our explanation for these predictions draws on features of each of the lines of research just discussed and is summarized in Figure 1 , which presents the perceived promise of different business ideas by people who are in the situations corresponding to the three experimental conditions in our main study. Depicted in the left-hand panel of the figure is the case, corresponding to the NOT condition in our experiment, of a potential entrepreneur who has not generated her own idea but is deciding whether to invest in a specific idea she is presented with (designated by the bold black circle containing an X). To decide whether to invest in this idea, the individual must make a guess about its merit relative to other, unknown ideas that the idea she is presented with may end up Downloaded from informs.org by [128.237.144 .175] on 21 January 2017, at 10:08 . For personal use only, all rights reserved. competing with (designated by the open circles). We assume that the individual in this situation assesses both the focal idea and the distribution of competing ideas in an unbiased fashion. This means that, as depicted in the figure, on average, the promise of the focal idea will be rated as being in the middle of the distribution of the perceived promise of the unknown ideas.
The middle panel of Figure 1 depicts the situation, corresponding to the OWN condition in our experiment, of an individual who has generated her own idea and has the opportunity to invest in it. Consistent with prior research on overconfidence, we assume that people tend to have an especially positive view of ideas they generate themselves and are unaware that their appraisals are biased. We represent such overconfidence by depicting, in the middle panel, an individual who rates the promise of their own idea as high. A second key assumption, whose examination is the central focus of a follow-up experiment we present after the main experiment, is that individuals who have generated an idea estimate the quality of others' unknown ideas quite differently than others' known ideas, but individuals who have not generated an idea do not manifest such a difference in their estimates. Consistent with Moore and Healy (2008) , Kruger (1999) , and Kruger et al. (2004) , we assume that people estimate the quality of ideas that they do not have direct exposure to based on their priors. These priors are likely to be inflated when people have proposed their own idea. In judging the quality of other people's unknown ideas (the open circles their absolute performance on easy knowledge quizzes. However, it is not obvious that business ideas are seen as comparable in difficulty to easy quiz items. Perhaps more importantly, business ideas are the fruit of personal effort, and prior research (Norton et al. 2012) shows that outcomes of personal effort, even on easy tasks, tend to be overly valued by people and, critically, that people expect others to value those outcomes highly as well.
in all three panels), when people have proposed their own idea, it is perfectly rational for them to use their appraisal of their own idea as a data point in judging the likely quality of ideas they have not seen (see, e.g., Dawes 1989 , Hoch 1987 . However, because their appraisal of their own idea is inflated, this results in a similar, but smaller, inflation in their guess about the quality of other people's unknown ideas. In Figure 1 , therefore, the perceived distribution of the quality of unknown ideas is elevated in both the OWN and OTH conditions in which the focal individual has generated her own idea, but not in the NOT condition, in which the focal individual has not generated an idea.
In the OWN condition, because the upward bias in the guess about the quality of unknown ideas is not as great as the bias in judging their own idea, we expect that people will still overestimate the relative value of their own ideas, which is consistent with their tendency to maintain a positive view of ideas they generated. However, this is not the case in the OTH condition, in which people evaluate others' known idea compared to competing unknown ideas. We assume that people who have generated an idea tend to evaluate others' known ideas impartially, 2 but the act of having generated their own idea biases upward their guesses about the quality of others' unknown ideas. As a result, people in the OTH condition tend to view the known idea they are evaluating as less favorable compared to unknown competing ideas, and they are less likely to invest in the known idea.
Putting all these lines of reasoning together generates the predictions that, first, as illustrated in the middle panel of Figure 1 , people will be overconfident about the quality of their own idea relative to other people's ideas. This prediction is consistent with a wide range of positive self-biases as well as with informational and egocentric accounts of overconfidence. Second, as illustrated by the right-hand panel of Figure 1 , people who have generated an idea of their own will tend to be underconfident about the quality of somebody else's known idea relative to other people's unknown ideas. Because they base their judgment of the quality of unknown idea in part on their inflated appraisal of their own idea, they underestimate the relative quality of somebody else's known idea. As illustrated by the left-hand panel of Figure 1 , however, we do not expect people to exhibit over-or underconfidence when evaluating others' ideas if they did not generate their own idea.
As a more nuanced test for our proposed theoretical framework, we compare the pattern of over-and 2 It is possible that people denigrate others' known ideas, which would only strengthen our predicted results.
underconfidence of participants who do and do not have experience with entrepreneurship. Our theoretical perspective predicts that those with greater experience are more likely to have a high view of their own abilities, which should lead to raising their overconfidence when they bet on their own idea but, critically, also increasing underconfidence when betting on another person's idea.
Aversion to Potential Appropriation by Others
In addition to examining the impact of idea generation on investment decisions, we examine the impact of whether an idea not invested in could potentially be invested in by another individual. On the basis of economic rationality, the presence of other investors who compete with a focal investor might well affect the focal investor's valuation of an investment opportunity. For example, if the opportunity attracts a lot of competition, this might decrease the prospects for future returns, making it less attractive. If, on the other hand, there were first-mover advantages, then the threat of another person investing might make it more attractive to invest early. It would also be possible that learning of others' interest in investing might indicate (or be interpreted as a kind of social proof) that the investment is good.
By contrast, there is no logical reason why the presence of another investor who may only consider whether to invest in the opportunity after the focal investor decides not to invest should affect the investment decision of the focal investor. In this scenario, which characterizes our experimental design, the focal investor's return on investment would not be affected by the second investor's decision, and focal investors would not receive any information about whether the other investor was interested in investment until they had made their own irreversible investment decisions.
The "possibility of appropriation by another person" aspect of the experiment was thus designed to isolate the impact of social factors on investment decisions. Prior research on and writing about entrepreneurship has emphasized the social dimension of entrepreneurial decisions (Granovetter 1995 , Sarason et al. 2006 . The presence of another person who might invest in an unexploited opportunity adds to the salience of losing the opportunity and its associated anticipation of regret and envy. Research on regret aversion (e.g., Loomes and Sugden 1982 , Zeelenberg et al. 1996 , Zeelenberg 1999 ) and social comparison envy (e.g., Salovey and Rodin 1984) finds that decisions are often affected by people's aversion to anticipated regret or envy, which is likely to be far more salient if another investor adopts an investment one declined to make. As a result, and consistent with Downloaded from informs.org by [128.237.144 .175] on 21 January 2017, at 10:08 . For personal use only, all rights reserved.
the concept of takeover aversion introduced and documented by Hoelzl and Loewenstein (2005) , we predict that potential entrepreneurs will invest more in an idea when there is a potential that the declined opportunity could be appropriated by somebody else. Figure 2 presents a narrative depiction of the flow of the experiment, a three by two factorial design with two stages. The procedure of the experiment was carefully explained to participants at different points during the experiment, and participants were required to answer a number of quiz-style questions at several points throughout the experiment to ensure that they had correctly understood how the experiment and the investment process worked. If they answered questions incorrectly, they were provided with clarifying information and then asked to answer the question again. Interested readers can try out each segment of the experiment by going to the following web page: http://cmusds.qualtrics.com/SE/?SID=SV _2ml2AXLwd0YiHgp. The experiment was implemented online using the Qualtrics survey interface.
Main Experiment Experimental Design
In the first stage of the experiment, some participants were asked to develop a business idea-specifically, to propose a business to be opened in a location in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, that was familiar to them. Although the location was familiar, participants were given a detailed description as well as photos and a map of the location. In part so that all participants would engage in both stages of the experiment (a feature that, if absent, could have produced selection effects), all participants, whether they were asked to develop a business idea or not, participated in the first stage by, at a minimum, completing a questionnaire that included questions about their experience with and interest in entrepreneurship. All participants were entitled to receive a $12 payment for completing the first stage of the experiment. From the large pool of business ideas proposed by participants, ideas were clustered randomly into groups of six. Each group of six ideas was presented to an anonymous judge who ranked the ideas from 1 to 6 based on their business promise and feasibility. Judges were recruited from Carnegie Mellon University Ph.D. students in entrepreneurship, economics, and management, and public policy.
In the second stage, participants who had completed the first stage were given an opportunity to invest in a business idea. Out of each group of six ideas that had been judged against one another, two were randomly selected. To test our predictions regarding the impact of idea generation on confidence and investment, three conditions were included in the experimental design. In the "OWN" condition, each of the two selected ideas was given to the person who had developed it in the first stage. In the "OTH" condition, the same two selected ideas were given to two other participants who had developed an idea in the first stage but not one of the two selected ones (nor any of the other four ideas that were clustered together in the group of six). Each participant in the OTH condition was given one of the selected ideas to invest in. To ensure that in all conditions no participant had, or believed that she had, information about ideas in the ranking other than the one they could invest in, participants in the OTH condition were informed that their idea was not among the six ideas that had been ranked. Finally, in the "NOT" condition, the same two selected ideas were given to two participants who had not developed a business idea in the first stage. Again, each participant in the NOT condition was given one of the two ideas to invest in. We gave the same ideas to participants in each of the three conditions so we could conduct a fixed effects analysis holding idea constant and focusing on the impact of condition (reported in Table A .3 of the appendix).
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in Figure 2 , in half of the groups (those in the appropriation-by-others condition, which is abbreviated as APPR), OWNs, OTHs, and NOTs were informed, truthfully, that if they failed to invest in the idea, a second investor would be given the opportunity to invest in that idea. In the other half of groups, there was no second investor. This design was implemented to test our predictions regarding the effects of the possibility of appropriation.
Because the design was complicated, we also show how subjects and ideas were grouped together, focusing only on the idea generation aspect of the study, and not on the threat of appropriation conditions. Figure 3 depicts the procedure for a representative group of 10 subjects, numbered 1 to 10 (top row). Eight of these subjects (numbered 1-8 in the diagram) were randomly assigned to generate ideas, and two (numbered 9 and 10) were not assigned to generate ideas. Six of the eight ideas were randomly selected (clustered in a rectangular box in the second row of the figure) and ranked against each other by a judge, from best to worst (ranking not shown in the figure) . Two of the six ideas (numbered 5 and 6 in the figure) were then randomly selected. In the OWN condition (subjects numbered 5 and 6 in the third row of the figure), each of the two randomly selected ideas was presented to the subject who developed that idea, and each subject had the opportunity to invest in her own idea. In the OTH condition (subjects numbered 1 and 2 in the fourth row of the figure), each of the randomly selected two ideas, numbers 5 and 6, was presented to a subject who had generated an idea, but not ideas 5 or 6. Each of the OTHs then decided how much to invest in the idea they were presented. Finally, in the NOT condition (subjects numbered 9 and 10), each of the two subjects who had not generated ideas were presented the randomly selected ideas (numbers 5 and 6) and decided how much to invest. We used the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (Becker et al. 1964) incentive-compatible method to elicit entrepreneurs' valuation of the opportunity to invest. Each participant decided, for a series of sequentially increasing investment amounts, whether to invest at each amount. Investment amounts started from $0.50 and could go as high as $12 (increasing in 50-cent increments). This process continued until the participant decided either not to invest at a specified amount or reached the highest possible investment amount ($12). Once a participant decided not to invest at a specified amount, it was automatically checked off that she did not wish to invest for all amounts greater than that. It was explained to participants that one of the investment decisions (including those automatically checked off) would be randomly selected to count for real. For example, if the investment decision for $5 was randomly selected and the decision for $5 showed "Invest," then the participant invested in the idea and paid $5 for making the investment. In another example, if the investment decision for $11 was randomly selected and the participant's decision had been to not invest at that amount, then she failed to invest in the idea and did not need to pay anything. Two of the quiz questions subjects were given ensured that they understood this procedure.
Downloaded from informs.org by [128.237.144 .175] on 21 January 2017, at 10:08 . For personal use only, all rights reserved. To ensure that subjects were happy with their investment decision, all of the investment choices including those automatically checked off were presented to them in a final page before submission and they were instructed as follows: "If you are satisfied with your investment decisions, submit them by proceeding to the next page. Otherwise use the back button to modify your decisions. Once you proceed to the next page, you will NOT be able to return to change your decisions."
Investment payoff was determined based on the judge's ranking of the idea (as described in Table 1 ). If an investor invested in an idea and it was ranked first among the six clustered ideas, the investor received $12. For a second-place ranking, the investor received $8, and for a third-place ranking, she received $4. If the idea was ranked from 4 to 6, the investor received no payment. In each of these cases, the investor had to pay the amount she had invested in the idea, with net losses being deducted from the $12 fee they earned for participating in the first stage of the experiment.
All participants were informed that, whether or not they invested in the idea, they would learn about the judges' ranking of the idea at the end of the experiment. This was done to prevent participants from investing for the purpose of learning the rank of their idea, i.e., to satisfy curiosity. Additionally, those in the APPR condition were informed that they would learn whether the second investor invested in the idea, and, if the second investor had invested, how much he or she had paid.
At the end of the experiment, after participants had submitted their investment decisions, but before they learned about their payoffs or the judge's ranking of the idea, all participants completed a brief questionnaire in which, among other questions, they were asked to guess the rank of the idea they had an option to invest in. Keeping all decisions within the experiment incentive compatible, we informed participants that correct guesses would be rewarded with an additional $1.
Participants and Procedure
Participants were recruited from alumni of Carnegie Mellon University (CMU) as well as from a pool of university students and alumni who had lived or were living in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. CMU alumni as well as students who had registered on a website indicating their interest in participating in experiments were sent invitation emails. We restrictively invited university students and alumni who had lived in Pittsburgh (more than 7,000 individuals) to participate in "an experiment on entrepreneurial decision making" for a participation fee of $12 and a chance to win money rewards up to a total of $24.5. No further information was given to them at this point. Most participants who completed the experiment did so within days of receiving the invitation email. We did not receive any completed response after the end of first month, and web links to participate in the second stage of the experiment were removed after three months.
Three hundred participants completed both stages of the experiment; however, 63 of them were second investors (in the APPR condition) who were included to avoid deception but are not central to the issues addressed by the study. Thus, the reported results are based on 237 participants, of whom 136 were university alumni and 101 were students; 71 had entrepreneurial experience (an average of 4.44 years for those who did). Overall, our sample provides a good mix of subjects with and without entrepreneurial experience, which resembles the mix of experience (and lack thereof) in the early stages of entrepreneurship in the real world. 
Measures and Variables
Dependent Variable. Participants' willingness to invest in the business opportunity is the main dependent variable of the study. The amount of investment (or equivalently, individuals' valuation of the opportunity) is a discrete cardinal (ratio-scale) variable that ranges from $0 to $12 (increasing in 50-cent increments).
Independent Variables. Idea generation status is designated by three binary variables (OWN, OTH, and 3 Our experimental procedures conform to those proposed by Simmons et al. (2011) . On the basis of considerations of statistical power, we selected an initial population to whom participation invitation emails were sent. After sending the last email, we waited for three months until web links to participate in the second stage of the experiment expired. Most participants who completed the experiment did so within days of receiving the invitation email. We did not receive any completed response after the end of the first month. We started data analysis after web links to participate expired at the end of third month. We included all completed responses in our analysis (i.e., no observation was omitted). Therefore, we did not collect further data after initiating analysis, and our sample size was determined exogenously and was equal to the number of participants who completed the experiment. In addition, consistent with the suggestions of Simmons et al. (2011) , all experimental conditions in this study include at least 20 observations, all variables and experimental conditions collected in the study are reported, no observation was rejected, and all statistical results are reported without covariates. NOT), each of which was set equal to 1 if a subject was in that condition and to 0 otherwise. The possibility of appropriation by somebody else is indicated by a binary variable, APPR, which was set equal to 1 if participants belonged to the group facing the prospect of another investor investing in their idea if they did not.
Cognitive and Emotions Variables. A survey was included at the end of experiment, after participants finalized their investment decisions but before they were given information about their payoff and ranking of the idea. It included items that measured passion and anticipated regret, using five-point Likert-type scales (ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree). Passion was measured by asking each participant whether she felt very enthusiastic about the idea. Anticipated regret was measured by asking each participant whether she would feel bothered if she ended up not investing in the idea and it ended up being highly ranked. 4 Overconfidence was measured by subtracting each participant's guess of the ranking of the idea he or she could invest in from the judge's ranking. In this sense, zero would represent a well-calibrated judgment, while negative and positive amounts are suggestive of underconfidence and overconfidence, respectively.
Control Variables. Control variables include Female, Rank (reflecting the judge's ranking of the idea, ranging from 1 to 6), Alum (equal to 1 if the participant is an alumnus and 0 if a student), Experience (indicating the total number of months the participant worked as self-employed or in a business completely or collaboratively started by the participant), and Field of study (coded with dummy variables for engineering, basic sciences, medical/health, art, social science/humanities, and business and economics). Because of an oversight, we failed to collect age information for all participants. Including experience and student/alumnus status as control variables should partly control for the effect of age.
Results
In our study, participants' valuation of opportunity was measured by the amount they chose to invest. Participants could not make negative investments and were not permitted to invest more than their $12 participation fee. Because our measure of valuation is censored, while its underlying behavioral tendency is not, we used a Tobit model (Tobin 1958) to analyze the effect of idea generation and potential appropriation on investment amounts. Figure 4 presents the means for investments made by participants in the six different experimental conditions. The overall pattern of investment levels provides clear evidence for our expected effects. OWNs invested the most, OTHs invested the least, and NOTs lay in between. On average, OWNs invested 93% more than OTHs ($5.18 versus $2.68). Participants in the APPR condition invested 19% more than those in the NO-APPR condition ($4.13 versus $3.48). Table 2 reports the results of the hierarchical Tobit regressions analyzing the effects of the experimental treatments on investment. The first specification (Model 1) includes only the effects of idea generation (OWN and OTH, with NOT as the reference group) and the possibility of appropriation as independent variables. Both variables have the predicted signs. The effect of the possibility of appropriation is significant at the 0.1 level, and the effect of idea generation is significant at the 0.01 level for OWN and borderline insignificant (p = 0 15) for OTH. Model 2 adds interactions between the possibility of appropriation and idea generation to test whether the effect of the possibility of appropriation depends on idea generation status. Comparison of Models 1 and 2 using the F -test for joint effect of interaction terms indicates that adding the interaction terms did not significantly improve the overall fit of the regression (Wald = 1 68; p < 0 43). In Model 3 we add control variables to Model 1; these have little impact on the primary effects. Model 4 is the same as Model 3 but controls for a participant's guess of the rank instead of the judge's ranking as in Model 3. Model 4 is included to show that the pattern of results does not change if we control for the subjective ranking by participants Figure 4 Investment Levels for Each Experimental Group
Notes. Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations. Investment was measured using a discrete cardinal scale ranging from $0 to $12 and increasing in 50-cent increments. Note. AIC, Akaike information criterion. a Engineering, Basic sciences, Medical/Health, Art, and Social science/ Humanities are dummy variables for field of study of participants. The reference group is Business and economics. * Significant at p = 0 10; * * significant at p = 0 05; * * * significant at p = 0 01. instead of judges' rankings. The experimental manipulations, therefore, had their anticipated effects and did not show any indication of interactions.
Figures 5a, 5b, and 5c present means for Passion, Overconfidence, and Regret across the six experimental conditions, respectively, and Table 3 presents three linear regression models in which these variables are dependent variables. Both the idea generation and the possibility of appropriation manipulations significantly influence passion, although whether passion should be considered a mediator or a variable that simply reflects participants' tendency to act on the opportunity is unclear (Adams et al. 2006) . Overconfidence, also, was significantly affected by the idea generation manipulation, but not the possibility of appropriation manipulation. On average, OWNs show overconfidence in their ranking of idea they could invest in; they rank the idea on average better Level of Passion for Each Experimental Group
Notes. Numbers within parentheses are standard deviations. Passion was measured using a five-point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 to 5.
Figure 5b Overconfidence Levels for Each Experimental Group
Notes. Numbers within parentheses are standard deviations. The measure of overconfidence ranges from −5 to +5.
Figure 5c Level of Anticipated Regret for Each Experimental Group
Notes. Numbers within parentheses are standard deviations. Anticipated regret was measured using a five-point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 to 5. than judge's ranking. More interestingly, OTHs show underconfidence in their ranking of the idea they could invest in. NOTs lie in between, and their guess of the ranking of the idea in the NO-APPR group is particularly close to the judge's ranking. In general, Downloaded from informs.org by [128.237.144 .175] on 21 January 2017, at 10:08 . For personal use only, all rights reserved. the pattern of investment levels coupled with the pattern of overconfidence across conditions supports our explanation that the difference in confidence (overand underconfidence) resulting from idea generation can lead to overvaluation or undervaluation of economic opportunities. Regression results (reported in  Table 3 ) confirm that, compared with NOTs, overconfidence is significantly higher for OWNs (p < 0 1) and significantly lower and negative (i.e., underconfidence) for OTHs (p < 0 05).
As seen in Figure 5c and Table 3 , Regret is not significantly affected by either experimental manipulation, which suggests that anticipated regret is not a main driver of the aversion to appropriation by others in our experiment. This finding runs counter to the finding from Hoelzl and Loewenstein (2005) that accentuated anticipation of regret contributes to takeover aversion. Regret is not always consciously accessed and is therefore difficult to measure with a subjective response item. In addition, regret was measured without any anchor points or points of comparison (see Hsee et al. 1999) . Thus, the measure may not have been defined precisely enough to pick up subtleties of differences across conditions. Participants in all conditions reported, on average, that they would experience substantial regret if they failed to invest but their investment would have paid off.
We also investigated whether passion, overconfidence, and regret mediate the effect of experimental manipulations on participants' investment in entrepreneurial opportunities. Table 4 reports Tobit models in which Passion, Overconfidence, and Regret are included as independent variables. Model 0 is the base model, which is the same as Model 3 in Table 2 . Adding Passion as an independent variable (see Model 1 in Table 4 ) renders all focal main effects insignificant. Nevertheless, as stated previously, Note. AIC, Akaike information criterion. * Significant at p = 0 10; * * significant at p = 0 05; * * * significant at p = 0 01.
whether passion should be considered a mediator or a variable that simply reflects participants' tendency to act on the opportunity is unclear. Model 2, which includes Overconfidence as an independent variable, shows a significant impact of overconfidence and substantially reduced coefficients for OWN and OTH, findings that are consistent with partial mediation of the idea generation effect by Overconfidence. Model 3, which includes Regret as an independent variable, results in a significant coefficient for Regret. It does not, however, support a mediation effect for Regret, given that inclusion of Regret has little impact on the coefficients for the experimental treatments. Note also that Regret is unaffected by experimental manipulation as presented in Table 3 and Figure 5c , a result that is also incompatible with Regret playing a mediating role.
Finally, we compared the pattern of results between participants who did or did not have experience with entrepreneurship. We compared the 166 participants who had no experience with entrepreneurship to the 71 people who had at least some experience with entrepreneurship (this is as close as we can come to a median split, since the median individual had no experience). Figures 6a and 6b Overconfidence Levels by Entrepreneurial Experience
Notes. Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations. The measure of overconfidence ranges from −5 to +5.
Figure 6b Investment Levels by Entrepreneurial Experience
Notes. Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations. Investment was measured using a discrete cardinal scale ranging from $0 to $12 and increasing in 50-cent increments.
experience show accentuated levels of both over-and underconfidence.
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We also compared the pattern of results between students and nonstudents. Student status is loosely correlated with experience status (Corr = 0 24), as several student participants were doing their graduate studies and did, in fact, have entrepreneurial experience, and several nonstudents were employees with no entrepreneurial experience. We did not find a difference for mean investment levels between students and nonstudents, although students exhibited slightly more overconfidence. 5 For those who reported experience with entrepreneurship, we also asked them whether they had ever experienced failure, and we conducted a post hoc analysis of the experience or nonexperience of failure on overconfidence (see the appendix, Figure A.1) . While the N values are small, the results are strikingly in accordance with what one would expect. Both groups with experience showed a greater impact of the main experimental manipulation on their level of confidence, but those who had not experienced failure were substantially more overconfident than those who had experienced failure.
Follow-up Experiment
The follow-up experiment was designed to focus on the OTH condition-specifically, to test the less obvious key assumption underlying our predictions of the results of the first study: that those who generated an idea themselves evaluate others' unknown ideas more favorably and others' known ideas less favorably compared with those who did not generate an idea themselves. This is the assumption that drives our most surprising prediction: that people who generate their own ideas will underestimate the value of another person's known idea that they have the opportunity to invest in.
The follow-up experiment had a two by two factorial design with two stages. In the first stage, half of the participants were randomly assigned to the OTH condition and were asked to propose an idea for facility development in a specific location in a familiar neighborhood adjacent to the CMU campus in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. The other half of participants were randomly assigned to the NOT condition and were not asked to propose a facility development idea. To keep the exerted effort levels about the same across all participants, individuals in the NOT condition were asked to propose an idea for another unrelated matter-namely, improving pedestrian safety in the neighborhood adjacent to the CMU campus. All participants were given $10 as a reward for proposing their idea, which then served as money they could invest if they chose to. The facility development ideas were rated by a group of judges, similar to those in the main study, who had no financial stake in the outcome of the experiment. Ideas were rated on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 meant that the idea was deemed to be totally worthless, and 10 meant that the idea was financially viable, seen as creating superior benefits for the neighborhood and CMU community, and almost certainly worthy of implementation.
In the second stage, participants were randomly assigned to either the KNOWN or UNKNOWN condition and were asked to invest in one of the facility development ideas. In the KNOWN condition, participants could invest in an idea that was known to them-i.e., presented in the same detail with which judges could see it. In the UNKNOWN condition, participants were simply told that the idea they had an option to invest in was randomly selected from the pool of ideas that were rated by judges, but they would not be shown the specific idea until after they made their investment decision.
Before making their investment decisions, all participants were informed that the idea they would have an option to invest in had been rated by a group of expert judges, and the method of rating was explained to them. Participants could invest any amount from $0 to $10. If the judges' rating of the Downloaded from informs.org by [128.237.144 .175] on 21 January 2017, at 10:08 . For personal use only, all rights reserved.
idea they had an option to invest in ended up being less than 7, they would lose the amount they invested, but if the judges' rating ended up being 7 or more, the amount of their investment was doubled and returned to them. After completing the investment task, participants guessed the judges' rating of the idea they had an option to invest in, as well as the idea they generated (if they had generated one), and were informed that they would be given an extra $1 for each correct guess. The difference between the participants' guesses and the mean of the judges' ratings (participant's guess minus judges' rating) of the ideas that could be invested in was used to create a measure of overconfidence in the quality of the idea.
The experiment was implemented online using the Qualtrics survey interface. Participants were recruited from alumni and students of CMU and other universities in Pittsburgh. Ninety-four participants completed the experiment (22 in OTH-KNOWN, 21 in OTH-UNKNOWN, 25 in NOT-KNOWN, and 26 in NOT-UNKNOWN conditions). Of 94 participants, 40 were university alumni and 54 were students. Thirty-three of the 94 participants had entrepreneurial experience, and of these, their average duration of entrepreneurial experience was 5.09 years. Data for demographics and other control variables were collected using a survey before the experiment.
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Results Figure 7 , panels (a) and (b) present the mean investment levels across four experimental conditions. The pattern of investment levels made by OTHs supports our theoretical assumption that individuals who have proposed an idea respond to others' unknown ideas quite differently than other's known ideas, and they tend to form an inflated appraisal of the quality of other people's unknown ideas. OTHs' investment in unknown ideas is 98.4% more than their investment in known ideas, while NOTs investments in unknown and known ideas are about the same (only a 9.8% difference). Figure 8 , panels (a) and (b) show that OTHs are overconfident in the quality of others' unknown ideas but underconfident in the quality of others' known ideas, but NOTs' confidence in the quality of others' ideas does not differ by whether the idea is known. Table 5 reports the results of hierarchical Tobit regressions analyzing the effect of the experimental treatments of the follow-up experiment on investment levels. Model 5 in Table 5 reports results for participants in the OTH condition and shows that OTHs' average investment on unknown ideas is significantly more than that for known ideas (p < 0 01). Model 6 in Table 5 reports results for participants in the NOT condition and shows that NOTs' average investment levels do not significantly differ between known and unknown ideas. Model 2 in Table 5 reports results for all participants and shows that, on average, OTHs invest less than NOTs, and investments made on UNKNOWN ideas are more than those on KNOWN ideas. Model 3 in Table 5 adds the interaction between UNKNOWN and OTH to Model 2, and it shows that the interaction term is marginally significant (p < 0 1), and its addition to the model renders the main effect of UNKNOWN insignificant. This result provides further supportive evidence that the impact of UNKNOWN on investment is attributable to participants in the OTH condition, because once belonging to OTH-UNKNOWN cell is controlled for by addition of the interaction term, UNKNOWN has no significant impact on participants' tendency to invest. Results from Model 8 in Table 5 shows that OTHs evaluate others' known ideas significantly lower than do NOTs (p < 0 01). This result provides strong evidence for the predicted impact of idea generation on individuals' valuation of others' (known) ideas, specifically for the difference between OTHs and NOTs, a finding that was marginal in the main experiment.
To test whether OTHs' tendency to value unknown ideas more than known ideas is mediated by their overconfidence in the quality of unknown ideas, we ran two regressions using experimental data from participants in the OTH condition. Table A .4 (in the appendix) reports the results of these regressions. Model 1, in which Overconfidence is the dependent variable, shows the significant positive impact of UNKNOWN on Overconfidence (p < 0 05). Model 2 is similar to Model 4 from Table 5 except for addition of Overconfidence as an independent variable. Results reported in Model 2 show that addition of Overconfidence resulted in a decrease in value of the coefficient of UNKNOWN, from 2.82 to 1.61. These results are consistent with partial mediation of the impact of UNKNOWN on investment levels by Overconfidence, which in turn is supportive of the theoretical assumption that idea generators tendency to value unknown ideas higher than known ideas is driven by their overconfidence in the quality of unknown ideas.
Concluding Remarks
Individuals who have developed an entrepreneurial idea are more likely to form biased evaluations of economic opportunities and to make distorted investment decisions as a result. On the one hand, when they have the opportunity to invest in an idea they generated, their judgment of the value of economic opportunities is characterized by overconfidence, and Downloaded from informs.org by [128.237.144 .175] on 21 January 2017, at 10:08 . For personal use only, all rights reserved. Notes. Alum is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the participant is an alumnus and 0 if a student. Collaboration is a dummy variable that is 1 if the participant has ever collaborated with others in starting a venture and 0 otherwise. Experience is the participant's level of entrepreneurial experience measured by the logarithm of the number of months. AIC, Akaike information criterion. * Significant at p = 0 10; * * significant at p = 0 05; * * * significant at p = 0 01.
they are prone to overinvest. On the other hand, when confronted with ideas developed by others, those who have generated ideas themselves exhibit underconfidence and are insufficiently likely to invest. In addition, the threat that others may invest in an idea if a potential investor forgoes the investment increases willingness to invest. Finally, entrepreneurial experience not only does not help mitigate the observed over-and underconfidence but seems to aggravate it. These findings contribute to our understanding of the psychological factors that influence entrepreneurial judgments and investment behaviors, over and above the effect of expected return on investment. At a policy level, our findings have implications for debates over adjusting the fees and stringency of enforcement of intellectual property rights (IPRs). While traditional accounts of intellectual property rights have assumed that strengthened IPR protection would lead to increased motivation to innovate, later research (e.g., Spence 1984; Cohen and Levinthal 1989a, b) drew attention to limitations of this perspective by suggesting that decreased IPR protection might result in increased spillover, which in turn could incentivize follower innovators who would benefit from available knowledge. Despite recognizing the possibility that follower entrepreneurs could benefit from weakened IPRs, neither Spence (1984) nor Cohen and Levinthal (1989b, a) argued that lowering the cost of imitation in some market settings might, in the net, increase pioneer entrepreneurs' willingness to invest and enter the market (though they did not rule out such a possibility). Our analysis suggests three new insights supporting the possibility that such an effect might occur. First, the current research suggests that lowering the cost of imitation, e.g., by decreasing the stringency of enforcement of IPRs, may increase entrepreneurship by pioneer entrepreneurs who are afraid that if they do not exploit an opportunity, someone else may do so. This may particularly be the case when, subsequent to commercialization of a breakthrough idea, entrepreneurial profit can be appropriated through mechanisms that do not depend on enforcement of IPRs, such as scale economies, lead time, first mover, or learning curve advantages.
Second, we find that imitators may be less threatening for entrepreneurship than what is generally assumed. Imitator entrepreneurs, except of the most rote variety, are likely to have generated their own ideas at one point. When faced with the opportunity to exploit somebody else's idea, such imitators may undervalue the opportunity and act less opportunistically than what pure profit maximization would predict.
Finally, our findings reveal that the investment decisions of pure imitators who have never developed their own ideas may be better (less biased) than those of innovators, who have experience with inventing an idea. Such imitators are, therefore, more likely to Downloaded from informs.org by [128.237.144 .175] on 21 January 2017, at 10:08 . For personal use only, all rights reserved.
invest, or desist from investing, when it makes economic sense. If relaxed enforcement of IPRs brings more of such investors into play, it could lead to an improvement in the efficiency of investment. Taken together, this trio of possible effects suggests that a more lenient appropriability regime could, surprisingly, have positive effects on entrepreneurship.
Our findings regarding the impact of idea generation on the evaluation of economic opportunities can also potentially shed light on one factor sometimes cited as a cause of spin-offs, as well as the industrial clusters that often emerge from spin-offs: the frequency of serious disagreements over the promise of ideas. Klepper (2007) and Klepper and Thompson (2010) proposed that disagreements about pursuing ideas led to the spawning of spin-offs by inventors of the ideas in the laser and automobile industries, among others. Nevertheless, mechanisms through which such disagreements emerge have received little attention from researchers. Our research points to a mechanism that may play an important role when multiple decision makers within a firm decide whether to invest in an idea, such as whether to launch or discontinue a product. Specifically, individual employees' judgments of the promise of the idea are likely to be affected by their self-perceived contribution to the development of the idea. Individuals who believe they deserve credit for generating the idea are likely to value it more highly than would others in the firm, especially those who have proposed competing ideas. These differences in idea valuation, derived from differences in self-perceived responsibility for generating ideas, can result in conflicts over whether to pursue ideas. Self-perceived inventors of the idea may then decide to leave the parent firm to pursue the idea through a spin-off. We also find that experienced people, and specifically those who have an idea of their own, are more likely to exhibit overor underconfidence, which might help explain one of the key findings of Klepper (2007) -that successful firms spawn more spin-offs. This might occur because successful firms tend to have more experienced (or otherwise knowledgeable) employees who, based on our findings, excessively overvalue their own idea and undervalue others' ideas and, hence, are more likely to find themselves in disagreement with others on the promise of ideas and to decide to leave the firm to pursue a seemingly promising idea that they believe is undervalued by the firm.
Identifying the importance of the possibility of appropriation by others as a motive underlying entrepreneurship can also, potentially, help to explain the phenomenon of "rush to market entry." Famous examples of rush to market entry occurred during the boom in Internet-related businesses in 1990s, when firms, many of which consisted of one or a few individuals, rushed to enter the market with similar products that were insufficiently refined or tested. For instance, in the early days of online search engines, many companies entered the market one after the other (such as Altavista, Infoseek, Yahoo!, and WebCrawler, among many others), using basically similar algorithms to do the online search tasks. Rush to market entry in the Internet industry went beyond what could be economically justified by first-mover advantage for pioneer entrants (Lieberman 2007) . Our research, and specifically the notion of aversion to appropriation by others, could help to explain such rush to market entry as being a function, in part, of entrepreneurs' fear that if they fail to exploit an opportunity, someone else will do so (Lieberman 2007, Lieberman and Asaba 2006) . Such an effect would be over and above any motivation arising from the perfectly rational fear of getting scooped. We find that both innovator and imitator investors are affected by the threat that someone else may invest, even when the second potential investor's presence has no impact on the returns of the initial investor. Therefore, the possibility of appropriation of idea by others in economic markets may motivate not only initial entry but also subsequent "copycat" entrants, resulting in the phenomenon of rush to market entry.
Our findings provoke questions whose answers would require further investigation. For instance, it would be interesting to explore whether entrepreneurs' increased motivation to invest is due to the simple presence of second investors or the fact that entrepreneurs will hear about the decisions and outcomes of second investors. The latter explanation is not supported by our finding that the level of anticipated regret among entrepreneurs is unaffected by the presence of a second investor, but this null finding might also be due to noise in our measure of anticipated regret. An experiment in which entrepreneurs would either receive or not receive information about investment decisions of second investors would provide more evidence on the psychological mechanism that underlies the aversion to the possibility of appropriation by others. It would also be interesting to explicitly examine, via either experiments or field data, the impact of the biases introduced by idea generation on spin-offs, as well as the impact of the possibility of appropriation by others on the phenomenon of rush to market.
The impact of the two mechanisms-idea generation and the possibility of appropriation by othersdiscussed here in connection with entrepreneurship very likely play an important role in other contexts. For example, academics seem prone to overrate the promise of their own ideas while being overly critical of others' findings and theories. Cognizant of such effects, editors of journals should be (and many, if not Downloaded from informs.org by [128.237.144 .175] on 21 January 2017, at 10:08 . For personal use only, all rights reserved. most, probably are) wary of soliciting reviews from, or at least placing much weight on the judgments of, researchers who have proposed alternative ideas. By the same token, many authors' protests of unfair treatment are doubtlessly colored by overblown appraisals of the value of their own ideas. Likewise, upon reflection on the influence of the possibility of appropriation, it is easy to imagine that academics would be more likely to pursue research ideas if they are afraid that if they fail to pursue the ideas, someone else may do so. Notes. The table presents a fixed effects analysis examining the impact of the experimental treatment on investment level (the dependent variable). Tobit estimates from the main regression analysis are included for ease of comparison. Rank is not included in the fixed effects analysis because it is constant for the same idea (and hence is controlled for via the fixed effects). The fixed effect analysis was conducted with a linear regression that included dummy variables for ideas. AIC, Akaike information criterion. * Significant at p = 0 10; * * significant at p = 0 05; * * * significant at p = 0 01. b This is a Tobit regression. The dependent variable is investment level. Only participants in the OTH condition are included in the analysis. * Significant at p = 0 10; * * significant at p = 0 05; * * * significant at p = 0 01.
